Rough Waters: Assessing the Fifth Amendment Implications of California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act by Green, Micah
The University of the Pacific Law Review
Volume 47 | Issue 1 Article 8
1-1-2015
Rough Waters: Assessing the Fifth Amendment
Implications of California’s Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act
Micah Green
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in The University of the Pacific Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Micah Green, Rough Waters: Assessing the Fifth Amendment Implications of California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 47 U.
Pac. L. Rev. 25 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview/vol47/iss1/8
	 25
Rough Waters: Assessing the Fifth Amendment 
Implications of California’s Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act 
Micah Green* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.   INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 25 
II.   THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING THE SCOPE OF THE 
BOARD’S JURISDICTION ................................................................................. 28 
A.  Only Some Groundwater ......................................................................... 29 
B.  Limited Regulatory Jurisdiction over Percolating Groundwater ............ 30 
1.  Permitting vs. Regulatory Jurisdiction ............................................. 30 
2.  Water Quality Regulation ................................................................. 32 
3.  The Public Trust Doctrine ................................................................ 33 
4.  Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution ........................... 34 
III.  NEW GROUNDWATER LEGISLATION: INTRODUCING SUSTAINABLE 
STANDARDS ................................................................................................... 37 
IV. ROUGH WATERS: DOES THE BOARD’S NEW ABILITY TO LIMIT PUMPING 
IMPLICATE A TAKINGS CLAIM? ..................................................................... 39 
A.  Does SGMA Expand Board Jurisdiction? ............................................... 39 
B.  Water Rights are Property Rights in California ...................................... 41 
C.  Applying the Doctrine of Regulatory Takings to Groundwater .............. 42 
1.  The Takings Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court ..... 42 
2.  Water Rights Takings Cases from California ................................... 44 
3.  Creation of New Jurisdiction Alone is Likely Insufficient to 
Support a Takings Claim .................................................................. 46 
4.  “As Applied” Takings ....................................................................... 47 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 48 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As California’s record-breaking drought enters its fourth year, the demand 
for groundwater resources only increases.1 Business is booming for well drilling 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2016; B.A. 
Philosophy, San Francisco State University, 2013. Special thanks to Professor Jennifer Harder for being a 
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companies as California’s Central Valley agricultural industry continues to rely 
on the water running underneath the earth’s surface.2 For example, in Fresno, 
Arthur & Orum Well Drilling, Inc. maintains a waiting list that is over a year 
long.3 Meanwhile, researchers have demonstrated that over-reliance on 
groundwater resources leads to adverse and irreversible environmental effects, 
including groundwater overdraft and land subsidence.4 To address this 
troublesome predicament, in late 2014, California lawmakers came together with 
the goal of making California’s groundwater management sustainable and 
enacted the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA).5 
As eminently laudable and sensible as SGMA may be, when viewed against 
the backdrop of the existing groundwater regulation framework, the legislation 
raises important questions.6 Does the jurisdictional shift contained within the new 
legislation unfairly upset the expectations of water right holders and property 
owners?7 If so, does this shift result in a “taking” of private property without just 
compensation within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution?8 
The development of the law surrounding groundwater management, 
allocation, and conservation in California has been a power struggle rife with plot 
twists. Lawmakers, advocates, rights holders, and members of the public have 
debated for decades about the degree of ultimate oversight that the state should 
possess over groundwater.9 Now, as new laws demand sustainable use and grant 
powers that the state once lacked, a look back through California’s groundwater 
saga provides the context necessary to understand its newest chapter.10 
The State Water Resources Control Board (“the Board”) is a state entity that 
oversees and protects California’s water resources and administers the California 
 
1. Lesley Stahl, Depleting the Water, CBS NEWS, Nov. 16, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
depleting-the-water/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See Devin Galloway & Francis S. Riley, San Joaquin Valley, California: Largest Human Alteration of 
the Earth’s Surface, 1182 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. CIRCULAR 23 (1999) (demonstrating the connection 
between groundwater over-draft and land subsidence, an irreversible environmental alteration that has many 
adverse effects on property). 
5. See infra Part III (outlining the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and the push for 
sustainability in general). 
6. See infra Part IV (detailing the questions raised by SGMA). 
7. See id (posing that question). 
8. See infra Part IV.C (dealing with the takings question). 
9. Reid Wilson, California Debates New Regulations for Diminishing Groundwater Amid Historic 
Drought, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/08/06/california- 
debates-new-regulations-for-diminishing-groundwater-amid-historic-drought/ (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
10.  See infra Parts II–III (outlining the long history of the Board’s jurisdiction and the latest step in its 
expansion). 
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permitting system.11 Section 1200 of the California Water Code establishes the 
parameters of SWRCB’s jurisdiction.12 The statute provides: “whenever the terms 
stream, lake, or other body of water . . . occurs in relation to [applications, 
permits, or licenses to appropriate], such terms refer only to surface water, and to 
subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels.”13 As a 
result, pumping from “subterranean streams” is subject to the SWRCB’s 
permitting authority,14 but groundwater that does not flow through a “known and 
definite channel” is not subject to the SWRCB’s permitting authority.15 This latter 
category is known as “percolating groundwater,” and common law principles and 
the courts regulate the use of such water, rather than the SWRCB.16 
Also relevant to the discussion is Article X, Section 2 of the California 
Constitution.17 In pertinent part, the constitutional amendment18 mandates that 
“the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use,” and “that the 
conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and 
beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare.”19 
The text also grants the legislature power to “enact laws in the furtherance of the 
policy” it sets forth.20 Commentators have argued that Article X, Section 2 was an 
expansion of state jurisdiction over groundwater rights;21 this Comment will 
demonstrate that, in fact, there has been a clear trend of increased oversight 
powers notwithstanding the “subterranean stream” limitation of Water Code 
Section 1200.22 The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act further expands 
the Board’s jurisdiction over percolating groundwater, expressly relying on the 
 
11. See About the Water Board, CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., http://www.swrcb.ca.gov 
/about_us/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (displaying the 
mission statement of the Board: “To preserve, enhance, and restore the quality of California’s water resources 
and drinking water for the protection of the environment, public health, and all beneficial uses, and to ensure 
proper water resource allocation and efficient use, for the benefit of present and future generations.”). 
12. CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 2015) [hereinafter “Section 1200”]. 
13. Id. 
14. See Water Rights: Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., http://water 
boards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_info/faqs.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Frequently Asked 
Questions] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that “[i]f you have a pre-1914 
[appropriative] right, you do not need a water right permit,” implying that post-1914 appropriative rights are 
subject to the Board’s permitting jurisdiction). 
15.  Andrew H. Sawyer, Subterranean Blues: Groundwater Classification in California, 6 CAL. WATER 
L. SYMP. 1, 15 (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.ourstreamsflow.org/documents/Subterranean 
%20streams_1.pdf) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
16. Id. at 3 




21. See Joseph L. Sax, We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6 U. DENV. 
WATER L. REV. 269, 308 (2002) (noting that attorneys for the Board have argued that Article X, Section 2 of 
the State Constitution allows for the Board’s jurisdiction to include unreasonably used groundwater). 
22. See infra Part II.B.4 (describing the trend of increased Board jurisdictional authority over 
groundwater). 
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legislature’s prerogative under Article X, Section 2.23 Under SGMA, the Board 
will have the ability to limit pumping to achieve sustainability under 
circumstances that previously would have been within courts’ exclusive 
jurisdiction.24 If this jurisdictional shift amounts to a taking of private property 
for public use within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, then water rights 
holders should receive just compensation. Likewise, if SGMA’s pumping limits 
require private property owners to bear a burden that is properly borne by the 
public as a whole, then water right holders should receive just compensation. 
Unfortunately for opponents of SGMA’s passage, existing California law would 
likely render a facial takings claim unsuccessful. There are, however, certain 
limited factual scenarios where application of SGMA could create a claim for 
just compensation. 
To reach those conclusions, Part II of this Comment explores the current 
framework of the Board’s jurisdiction over groundwater.25 Part III describes the 
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, passed in late 2014, and the 
jurisdictional changes contained within that Act.26 Part IV addresses questions 
raised by the Act about whether the expanded Board jurisdiction therein is 
consistent with the protections against uncompensated takings contained within 
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.27 Finally, assuming that the 
expansion of the Board’s jurisdiction implicates a takings question, the remainder 
of this Comment explores whether a takings claim should be recognized if the 
Board exercises the new authority granted by SGMA to restrict pumping.28 
II. THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING THE SCOPE OF THE 
BOARD’S JURISDICTION 
A statutory framework interpreted by decades of case law governs the power 
of the Board to limit the pumping of groundwater resources; this framework 
makes it clear that the Board has limited regulatory jurisdiction over 
groundwater.29 This Section examines two of the most distinct aspects of the 
Board’s jurisdiction over groundwater. First, this Section outlines why the Board 
 
23. See infra Part IV.A (concluding that the legislature has expanded Board jurisdiction). 
24. Id. 
25. See infra Part II (demonstrating the current limitations on the Board’s jurisdiction). 
26. See infra Part III (outlining the basics of the powers granted to the Board by the Act and the 
legislation related to it). 
27. See infra Part IV.C (answering this question in detail). 
28. See infra Part IV.C.3 (recognizing that a facial takings claim against SGMA as a whole will likely 
prove unsuccessful, but also noting that California should recognize two specific “as applied” takings 
arguments). 
29. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200–1202 (limiting the Board’s regulatory jurisdiction to 
subterranean streams); see also Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 119, 141 (1903) (a case interpreting that 
framework and holding against regulatory jurisdiction over percolating groundwater). 
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only has jurisdiction over certain types of groundwater rights.30 Then, this Section 
explores four developing areas of groundwater law that have expanded the 
Board’s ability to regulate groundwater usage and pumping under certain 
circumstances.31 In doing so, this section will outline the general parameters of 
the Board’s jurisdiction over groundwater in California and demonstrate its 
expansion.32 
A. Only Some Groundwater 
The California Water Code and the courts interpreting it have together 
created a distinction between percolating groundwater and subterranean 
streams.33 Percolating groundwater is “water held in the earth,”34 and is not 
subject to the provisions of the Water Code addressing jurisdiction over 
groundwater.35 Because percolating groundwater typically exists in the soil of an 
overlying landowner’s property,36 it was historically considered “open for 
exploitation.”37 Thus, in the past, courts would say that “no law will prevent or 
interfere with” its extraction.38 However, as the law evolved, courts began to 
recognize that percolating groundwater is not a purely private property right and 
that the state may regulate its use in some circumstances.39 
In contrast, subterranean streams are waters that move underground “in 
channels with definite beds and banks . . . in definite streams.”40 Because the law 
subjects water found in a definite channel to appropriation,41 and due to Water 
Code Section 1200’s unambiguous language,42 the Board possesses clear 
jurisdiction over subterranean streams.43 Section 1200 of the Water Code 
 
30. See infra Part II.A (outlining the difference between percolating groundwater and subterranean 
streams, and the role that difference plays in determining whether the Board has jurisdiction to regulate). 
31. See infra Parts II.B.1–4 (addressing these potential limitations). 
32. See id. (demonstrating the trend). 
33. Katz, 141 Cal. at 141. 
34. Id. 
35. See CAL. WATER CODE §1200 (stating that the Code applies only to “surface water” and 
“subterranean streams,” while explicitly not mentioning the percolating groundwater in the soil). 
36. See Cross v. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217, 222 (1886) (holding that “[w]ater percolating in the soil belongs to the 
owner of the freehold.”). 
37. Katz, 141 Cal. at 128. 
38. Id. 
39. See, e.g., id. at 134 (noting that percolating groundwater use must be “reasonable”). 
40. Wells A. Hutchins, California Groundwater: Legal Problems, 45 CAL. L. REV. 688 (1953). 
41. See CAL. WATER CODE §1201 (stating that “[a]ll water flowing in any natural channel” that has not 
already been put to beneficial use is “public water of the State and subject to appropriation in accordance with 
[the Water Code].”). 
42. See id. § 1200 (conferring jurisdiction to the Board over subterranean streams). 
43. See, e.g., North Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1577, 1583 
(2006) (noting that the Board argued that the groundwater in question belonged to a subterranean stream, and 
was thus “subject to [its] jurisdiction.”). 
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expressly grants jurisdiction over the use of such waters, stating that “whenever 
the [term] . . . water occurs in relation to applications to appropriate water or 
permits or licenses to such applications, such term refers only to surface water, 
and to subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels.”44 
The judiciary has affirmed a legal test that the Board devised for classifying 
groundwater as either percolating or part of a subterranean stream.45 Pursuant to 
this test, a watercourse is a subterranean stream, and therefore subject to the 
Board’s jurisdiction, when (1) a “subsurface channel [is] present;” (2) that 
“channel [has] a relatively impermeable bed and banks;” (3) “the course of the 
channel [is] known or capable of being determined by reasonable inference;” and 
(4) there is groundwater “flowing in the channel.”46 This framework limits the 
scope of the Board’s jurisdiction, because if a party can successfully demonstrate 
that a given source of groundwater is percolating, then prior to enactment of 
SGMA, the Board arguably has little, if any, authority over groundwater 
pumping.47 
B. Limited Regulatory Jurisdiction over Percolating Groundwater 
This section explores four of the most important contours of the Board’s 
jurisdiction over groundwater prior to the enactment of SGMA. Subpart 1 
explains the Board’s permitting and regulatory jurisdiction, the two possible 
sources of authority to limit groundwater extraction.48 Subpart 2 looks at the 
Water Code’s water quality provisions and the limits they place on the Board’s 
jurisdiction.49 Subpart 3 examines how courts have employed the public trust 
doctrine to regulate groundwater in some situations.50 Finally, Subpart 4 
examines how the legislature and the Board itself have expanded Board 
jurisdiction by relying largely on Article X, Section 2 of the California 
Constitution.51 
1. Permitting vs. Regulatory Jurisdiction 
California groundwater law requires water users who pump from a 
subterranean stream to obtain a permit from the Board before pumping or 
diverting a supply of water, but the law does not require water users who pump 
 
44. WATER § 1200. 
45. North Gualala, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1585. 
46. Id. 
47. See id. (implying that the Board’s jurisdiction is not absolute because of the distinction between 
percolating groundwater and subterranean streams). 
48. See infra Part II.B.1. 
49. See infra Part II.B.2. 
50. See infra Part II.B.3. 
51. See infra Part II.B.4. 
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percolating groundwater to obtain any Board permit.52 This limited permitting 
authority begs a question left almost untouched by California’s judiciary: does 
the Board’s power to grant permits for water use differ from its power to regulate 
water use? 
No court has directly addressed that issue, although one recent case is 
relevant: in Light v. State Water Resources Control Board, the Board issued a 
regulation prohibiting certain uses of surface water53 on the basis that such use 
was unreasonably and adversely affecting local aquatic habitat.54 Multiple surface 
water users sued, asserting that the Board lacked jurisdiction over their riparian 
and pre-1914 appropriative surface water rights.55 Despite the fact that the Water 
Code establishes that the Board does not have permitting authority over riparian 
and pre-1914 water rights, the court held that “if . . . the [l]egislature has the 
power to enact general rules governing the reasonable use of water, the Board has 
a similar regulatory authority” pursuant to Article X, Section 2.56 In doing so, the 
court rejected the argument that the Board’s authority is limited to enforcement 
actions and instead reasoned on policy grounds that “[e]fficient regulation of the 
state’s water resources . . . demands that the Board have the authority to enact 
tailored regulations.”57 
Although the Light holding only applies to riparian and early appropriator 
surface rights, and not groundwater rights, the holding can be extended by 
analogy to groundwater. For all three types of water rights, the Water Code 
establishes a lack of Board jurisdiction;58 likewise, for all three types of water 
rights, Article X, Section 2 imposes a duty of reasonableness.59 Light’s citation to 
the broad role of the Board, and the court’s concern for efficient regulation 
applies equally to percolating groundwater as to riparian and pre-1914 rights. 60 
Light suggests that it is possible to have a water right that is subject to the 
Board’s regulatory power, but not to the Board’s permitting authority—a concept 
rarely invoked prior to the case.61 
 
52. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200, 1221. 
53. See Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 226 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1472 (2014) (explaining that 
landowners were diverting the water flowing through a stream and using it to irrigate local vineyards and 
orchards). 
54. Id. 
55. See id. (explaining the plaintiffs’ argument that they were exempt from Board jurisdiction due to their 
possession of groundwater rights as “riparian users and early appropriators, whose diversion is beyond the 
permitting authority of the Board.”). 
56. See id. at 1484–85 (stating that “[t]he Water Code authorizes the Board, in carrying out its statutory 
duty to administer the state’s water resources, ‘to exercise the adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the 
state.’”). 
57. Id. at 1487. 
58. Id. 
59. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. 
60. See Light, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1487. 
61. See id. at 1472–73 (referring to permitting and regulatory jurisdiction as two separate possible sources 
of power over water resources). 
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Despite the Light court’s suggestion that permitting and regulatory authority 
are not necessarily co-extensive, practicalities and policy suggest a more nuanced 
analysis. As a practical matter, permitting requires a water user to do two things: 
(1) to affirmatively obtain permission to divert water and (2) to comply with the 
terms and conditions that the Board may impose.62 In contrast, a regulatory 
process without permitting requires a water user to comply with Board rules, but 
only after the water user establishes a water right.63 In both cases, a water user’s 
property interest in water is subject to Board rules. In the end, what matters to 
groundwater pumpers is whether the Board may compel them to limit pumping, 
which it may do regardless of whether it has permitting jurisdiction.64 In this 
regard, exercise of regulatory jurisdiction overwhelms the absence of permitting 
authority, leaving the question of why the legislature failed to grant such 
authority in the first place. 
As a policy matter, a legal structure that has no upfront permitting 
requirement, but nonetheless allows regulation of use after the fact, seems to be a 
recipe for poor planning, chaos, and discontentment. Without a permit 
requirement, a water user may invest in pumping and rely on pumped water, but 
thereafter be limited or excluded from realizing that investment due to a 
regulatory action by the Board. This scenario is arguably inefficient from an 
economic, social, and water resource perspective. However, the courts may 
nonetheless trend in the direction of upholding Board jurisdiction, as in Light, 
simply because, without legislative action, management of percolating 
groundwater basins would continue to be subject to the vagaries of local 
resources and influences—a practicality that was a driving force behind SGMA. 
2. Water Quality Regulation 
In 1969, the California legislature enacted a suite of laws to ensure 
heightened water quality standards.65 One of those provisions, Water Code 
Section 2100, gave the Board the authority to file suit in court in order to limit 
pumping to protect groundwater quality.66 Notably, the Board could not impose 
such pumping cuts directly, much like the scope of authority granted to the Board 
under other Water Code provisions.67 The Board has never in fact filed such 
 
62.  Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 14. 
63. Id. 
64. See, e.g., Light, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1487 (noting that the right holders were outside permitting 
jurisdiction but nonetheless fell within the rules regarding reasonableness). 
65. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2100–2102. 
66. Id. § 2100 (“the board may file an action in the superior court to restrict pumping, or to impose 
physical solutions, or both, to the extent necessary to prevent destruction of or irreparable injury to the quality 
of [groundwater].”) 
67. See, e.g., id. § 275 (stating that “[t]he department and board shall take all appropriate proceedings or 
actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable 
method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water in this state”). 
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adjudication, although there are some examples of the Board invoking its Section 
2100 authority in an effort to compel local action.68 
3. The Public Trust Doctrine 
With roots stretching back to English common law, the public trust doctrine 
imposes an obligation on the state to protect navigable and tidally influenced 
waters for common use by the public.69 In the touchstone case, National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of California held that state water 
right allocation must ensure protection of trust uses where feasible.70 The Court 
also held that as a matter of logic, this obligation extends to non-navigable 
streams where water use and diversion affect navigable watercourses.71 Under 
this reasoning, the Board’s authority to protect the public trust might extend to 
percolating groundwater, at least where pumping impacts navigable or tidally 
influenced water subject to the trust.72 
The recent case of Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources 
Control Board addressed that precise issue.73 There, the petitioner alleged that 
groundwater pumping had diminished the flow of the Scott River, damaging fish 
populations and decreasing opportunities for recreational activities like boating 
and swimming.74 In July 2014, addressing a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, the superior court issued an opinion holding that where pumping 
causes harm to navigable waters, the public trust doctrine allows the Board to 
restrict pumping in order to protect those waters held in the public trust.75 It is 
important to keep in mind that this was a superior court holding, and thus, it has 
limited value as of yet.76 However, the decision does represent a willingness to 
move closer to regulating groundwater not previously within the government’s 
reach. Judicial receptiveness to the application of the public trust doctrine to 
 
68. See, e.g., STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., RESOLUTION NO. 88-114, RESOLUTION CALLING FOR 
JOINT ACTION BY FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AGENCIES TO REMEDY CONTAMINATION IN THE MAIN SAN 
GABRIEL GROUND WATER BASIN (1988). 
69. Hope M. Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 393, 396–
97 (2009). 
70.  33 Cal. 3d 419, 426 (1983). 
71. Id. at 437. 
72. See, e.g., Press Release, Envtl. Law Found., Court Rules Groundwater Protected as Public Trust (July 
16, 2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (advocating the use of the public trust 
doctrine to proscribe use of groundwater resources where pumping causes harm to waters protected by the 
public trust). 
73. Order after Hearing on Cross Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings at 2, Envtl. Law Found. v. State 
Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34–2010–80000583 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014), 2014 WL 8843074. 
74. Id. at 3–4. 
75. Id. at 13. 
76. Id at 1. 
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groundwater resources is part of a trend toward broader Board authority to 
regulate groundwater use.77 
4. Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution 
Enacted by voters in 1928,78 Article X, Section 2 of the California 
Constitution mandates a standard of “reasonable” use, stating that “the right to 
water or to the use . . . of water . . . is and shall be limited to such water as shall 
be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not 
and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use.”79 Article X, Section 2 also 
requires that “the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use to the 
fullest extent of which they are capable.”80 Although Article X, Section 2 is self-
executing, the Water Code authorizes the Board to take measures necessary to 
“prevent . . . unreasonable use.”81 The exact scope of the authority that Article X, 
Section 2 grants is unclear.82 Given this ambiguity, water interests clash over the 
question of whether the constitutional provision provides sufficient regulatory 
power to the Board to give the Board jurisdiction over certain water rights—such 
as rights to percolating groundwater—which the Board otherwise clearly does 
not have jurisdiction.83 
Despite this ambiguity, the Board has in fact invoked Article X, Section 2 to 
assert regulatory jurisdiction over rights that would not otherwise be within its 
jurisdiction.84 California’s judiciary has thus far upheld such Board action,85 
although it could be argued that the few cases that exist are limited to their facts. 
One of the first cases to convey this type of reasoning is SWRCB v. Forni.86 
There, without reference to the constitutional provision, the court found that the 
constitutional and statutory requirements of reasonable and beneficial use applied 
to a riparian right holder.87 In reaching the decision to uphold the Board’s action, 
the court relied heavily on Water Code Section 275, and ultimately held that the 
 
77. See id. at 13. (paving the way and bolstering the argument for such an expansion). 
78. Bryan E. Gray, In Search of Bigfoot: The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the 
California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 225 (1989). 
79. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. 
80. Id. 
81. CAL. WATER CODE § 275; see, e.g., Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 186 Cal. 
App. 3d 1160, 1163 (1986) (stating that “the Board has adjudicatory power in the matter of unreasonable use of 
water”). 
82. Sax, supra note 21, at 313. 
83. Id. at 308. 
84. People ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743 (1976); Imperial Irrigation, 
186 Cal. App. 3d at 1163 (1986); Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 226 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1487 (2014). 
85. See, e.g., Imperial Irrigation, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1163 (stating that “the Board has adjudicatory 
power in the matter of unreasonable use of water.”); Light, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1473 (following the same 
logic). 
86. 54 Cal. App. 3d 743 (1976). 
87. Id. at 752–53. 
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code section confers an affirmative power to the Board that allows it to “bring an 
action in which the reasonableness of . . . water use could be adjudicated.”88 
Water Code Section 275 states that the “board shall take all appropriate 
proceedings or actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to 
prevent waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable 
method of diversion of water in this state.”89 However, the court substantially 
rested its decision on the fact that the Board was exercising only the power to 
bring the action to court, and not to direct regulation.90 
Courts became more overtly supportive to the idea of broader Board 
jurisdiction over unreasonable uses over time: a decade after Forni, the court in 
Imperial Irrigation District v. SWRCB addressed whether the Board’s 
determination that a water district’s failure to implement conservation measures 
constituted unreasonable use was binding on the District, despite the fact that the 
district held pre-1914 rights.91 Ultimately, the court held that the Board has 
adjudicatory power as to unreasonable water use.92 Rather than relying on Section 
275, the court based this notion on Article X, Section 2.93 The Imperial Irrigation 
decision appears to be the earliest direct authority for Board exercise of broad 
regulatory jurisdiction over the question of reasonable use under Article X, 
Section 2. The Imperial Irrigation court, however, never grounded its decision in 
any specific legal authority other than the desirability of the Board wielding 
comprehensive power over the question of reasonable use.94 
Despite this slim foundation, the idea of broad Board authority under Article 
X, Section 2 appears to be trending toward acceptance. Nearly forty years after 
Forni, the court in Light again questioned whether the Board had the authority to 
enact regulations concerning unreasonable use.95 Unlike Forni, Light considered 
whether the Board imposed the regulation directly on the water user rather than 
relying on a court process (although the regulation itself was fairly restrained, 
requiring the water users to develop their own management plans rather than the 
Board imposing plans on them).96 The Light petitioners argued that in adopting 
this regulation, the Board had exceeded its authority under Water Code Section 
275 to bring actions before the judiciary, legislature, and other administrative 
agencies. Thus, the Light court was squarely focused on the scope of the Board’s 
 
88. Id. at 753. 
89. CAL. WATER CODE § 275. 
90. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d at 754. 




95. 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1472–73. 
96. Compare id. at 1472 (dealing with a Board regulation on unreasonable use) with SWRCB v. Forni, 54 
Cal. App. 3d 743 (1976) (addressing whether the Board could bring an action concerning unreasonable use, and 
concluding that such action comes within the express language of Water Code section 275). 
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jurisdiction under Article X, Section 2.97 The court held that the constitutional 
provision confers broad jurisdiction, and by specifying that the Board could take 
actions to court, Section 275 simply outlined one approach that the Board could 
take and did not limit other approaches.98 Invoking Imperial Irrigation’s broad 
principles, the Light court held that the Board has the “authority to prevent . . . 
unreasonable use of water, regardless of the basis under which the right is held.”99 
The Light opinion stated that Article X, Section 2 confers upon the Board a 
“separate and additional power” from that given in Section 275 “to take whatever 
steps are necessary to prevent unreasonable use.”100 The court also relied upon 
Water Code Section 174, which grants the Board the power to “exercise the 
adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the state in the field of water 
resources,”
101
 and Section 186, which affords the Board “any powers . . . that may 
be necessary or convenient for the exercise of its duties authorized by law.”102 
Although these holdings are potentially very powerful, it is notable that their 
reasoning is rather thin. For instance, the court in the Imperial Irrigation case 
grounded the Board’s regulatory power over pre-1914 rights—rights over which 
the Board otherwise does not have jurisdiction—in Article X, Section 2 and in so 
doing, referenced several provisions of the Water Code.103 However, neither 
Article X, Section 2 nor those Water Code provisions specifically grant the 
Board jurisdiction over pre-1914 rights, and arguably, the very general language 
of these provisions fails to support the argument that they were intended to alter 
jurisdiction. Moreover, neither the Light court nor the Imperial Irrigation court 
presents a convincing legal argument for such a change, as sound as their policy 
rationales might be.104 Of course, these decisions are binding and courts are 
unlikely to reverse them. 
Despite their thin legal underpinning, the ultimate conclusion of these 
cases—that consistent and comprehensive regulation of water resources is most 
desirable regardless of a lack of legislative clarity on the issue—seems eminently 
sensible. Perhaps for this reason, if not for any other, Article X, Section 2 is 
increasingly invoked as a source of Board power, even over water rights to which 
 
97. See 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1481–82 (lacking other grounds to uphold the regulation, the court relied 
heavily on the expansive language of the constitutional provision and the fact that Board jurisdiction “has 
steadily evolved from the narrow role of deciding priorities between competing appropriators to the charge of 
comprehensive planning and allocation of waters”). 
98. Id. at 1495. 
99. Id. at 1487. 
100. Id. at 1486. 
101. CAL. WATER CODE § 174. 
102.  Id. § 186. 
103. See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160, 1169–70 
(1986) (citing to California Water Code Sections 275 and 1050 for the proposition that “the Board has the 
‘separate and additional power to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent unreasonable use”) (quoting 
United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 142 (1986) (emphasis in original)). 
104. See, e.g., WATER § 100 (cited by the Imperial Irrigation court, and mandating a statewide water 
policy but not mentioning the constitutional provision). 
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it otherwise does not have jurisdiction.105 In this regard, twenty-five years ago, 
one commentator characterized Article X, Section 2 as “something of a sleeping 
giant, which may be awakened in future years as water grows shorter in supply 
and the interest in water conservation increases.”106 After a century-long nap, the 
giant may finally be awake. In 2014, the legislature invoked Article X, Section 2 
to confer substantial new powers on the Board in the groundbreaking Sustainable 
Groundwater Management Act.107 
III. NEW GROUNDWATER LEGISLATION: INTRODUCING SUSTAINABLE 
STANDARDS 
During their 2013–2014 legislative session, California lawmakers recognized 
several problems connected to the state’s reliance on groundwater resources 
during dry years, including the ability of most groundwater users to pump at an 
unregulated rate.108 In response to these problems, the legislature passed three 
bills related to sustainable local groundwater management that Governor Jerry 
Brown later signed into law; collectively, these three bills make up the 
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act.109 SGMA is a groundbreaking effort 
to mandate sustainable groundwater use,110 so as to avoid “over-drafting”111 the 
state’s already-depleted water supplies.112 
The Act primarily focuses on the roles of local groundwater management 
entities and finds that “groundwater resources are most effectively managed at 
the local or regional level” and that “groundwater management will not be 
 
105. See, e.g., Light, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1473 (citing to the constitutional provision to support regulation 
of unreasonable uses). 
106. Gray, supra note 78, at 226. 
107. SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014). 
108. See SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (finding that “[e]xcessive groundwater pumping 
can cause overdraft, failed wells, deteriorated water quality, environmental damage, and irreversible land 
subsidence . . . .”). 
109. AB 1739, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014); SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014); 
SB 1319, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (collectively referred to as the Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act). 
110. See generally EDMUND G. BROWN, GOVERNOR, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA WATER 
ACTION PLAN (2014) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN] (advocating for sustainable water use 
and “serious groundwater management”); see also Lisa Lien-Mager, Senate Committee Advances Groundwater 
Bill, ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES, April 22, 2014, http://www.acwa.com/news/groundwater/senate-
committee-advances-groundwater-bill (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting Senator 
Fran Pavley, author of SB 1168 and SB 1319: “Everyone—literally everyone—seems to be working on 
groundwater this year”). 
111. See SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (stating that over-draft occurs when a given 
basin is pumped at a faster pace than the rate at which it recharges its groundwater supply). 
112. See, e.g., Sara Jerome, Water Bills Advance in California Senate, WATER ONLINE, May 14, 2014, 
http://www.wateronline.com/doc/water-bills-advance-in-california-senate-0001 (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (stating that “California is pushing up against the limits of our finite water supply,” and 
calling the current state of affairs a “water crisis”); see also Galloway, supra note 4 (noting that the 
groundwater aquifers in California have been over-pumped for years). 
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effective unless local actions to sustainably manage groundwater basins and 
subbasins are taken.”113 Consequently, groundwater management entities and 
rights holders must now create management plans that specify a “sustainable 
yield”114 for the underground basins within their purview, and the basin must be 
managed to achieve that sustainable level by a deadline.115 In order to enforce this 
mandate, the legislature amended the Water Code to grant new powers to the 
state through the Board.116 It added two main functions to the state’s 
responsibilities: prioritization117 and enforcement.118 
Pursuant to the new sustainable groundwater management provisions, the 
state now has the authority to prioritize groundwater basins by their depletion 
levels and risk of overdraft.119 Management entities in charge of the highest 
priority basins will have to create plans more quickly than those that manage 
lower priority basins.120 These plans must be designed in a way that achieves a 
satisfactory result within twenty years.121 
In order to ensure that management entities actually develop these plans, the 
new legislation makes its most impactful change by allowing for Board 
enforcement. Upon noncompliance with the new planning requirements and a 
determination that a basin is probationary,122 the Board may arrange for a 
qualified third party to develop a groundwater management plan for the basin.123 
The Board may adopt such a plan one year after designating a basin as 
probationary as long as the specific problems noted during designation have not 
been addressed and remedied.124 Ultimately, the Board only has the authority to 
rescind its interim plans if it determines that the sustainability plan and the 
activities moving forward are “adequate.”125 This could mean indefinite control 
 
113. SB 1168 § 1(a)(6)–(7), 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014). 
114. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(v) (enacted by Chapter 346) (defining “sustainable yield” as the 
“maximum quantity of water . . . that can be withdrawn annually . . . without causing an undesirable result”). 
115. Id. § 10727(a) (enacted by Chapter 346); CAL. WATER CODE § 10726.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 346). 
116. See generally AB 1739, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014); SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. 
(Cal. 2014); SB 1319, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (known collectively as SGMA). 
117.  WATER § 10933(b) (enacted by Chapter 346). 
118.  Id. § 10735.4(c) (enacted by Chapter 347). 
119.  Id. § 10933(b) (enacted by Chapter 346). 
120. Compare id.§ 10720.7(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 346) with id.§ 10720.7(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 
346) (allowing low-priority basins two more years to adopt sustainability plans than basins of high- and 
medium-priority). 
121. CAL. WATER CODE § 10727.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 346). 
122. See id. § 10735.2 (enacted by Chapter 347) (stating that “the board may . . . designate a basin as a 
probationary basin if” any of the listed criteria are met, such as failure to form a management entity by 2017 or 
to create a management plan by 2020). 
123.  Id. § 10735.4(c) (enacted by Chapter 347). 
124.  Id. §§ 10735.6–8 (enacted by Chapter 347). 
125.  Id. § 10735.8(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 347). 
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over the basins that continually fail to meet the Board’s standards, regardless of 
the rights held by the entities that operate those basins.126 
IV. ROUGH WATERS: DOES THE BOARD’S NEW ABILITY TO LIMIT PUMPING 
IMPLICATE A TAKINGS CLAIM? 
Regulators disagree with users and appropriators about the practical 
implications of statewide monitoring, prioritization, and the possibility of 
intervention.127 However, the focus of this Comment is not the pros and cons of 
the new legislation, but the way in which it expands Board jurisdiction, and 
whether such expansion creates a takings issue.128 Therefore, the next section 
determines whether the legislature has expanded the Board’s jurisdiction.129 Upon 
concluding that the legislature has indeed increased the Board’s jurisdictional 
scope, the sections thereafter discuss the nature of groundwater rights130 and the 
viability of a takings claim.131 
A. Does SGMA Expand Board Jurisdiction? 
The question of whether SGMA expands the Board’s authority in a manner 
relevant to a takings analysis depends on whether the Board had the authority to 
limit pumping of percolating groundwater rights prior to the enactment of 
SGMA. If the Board had that authority, then SGMA did not, as a practical matter, 
alter the Board’s ability to regulate percolating groundwater rights—it merely 
changed the regulatory framework. From this perspective, Article X, Section 2 of 
the California Constitution provides the best support for the argument that 
SGMA does not expand the Board’s jurisdiction.132 The constitutional provision 
mandates reasonable and beneficial use of all of California’s water resources, 
including groundwater.133 Further, as explored above, at least one court has 
recognized the Board’s regulatory authority concerning reasonable uses to be as 
broad and expansive as possible.134 These authorities suggest that SGMA has not 
 
126. Id. 
127. For a review of those issues, see Micah Green, Article, Chapters 346 and 347: Keeping California’s 
Thirst for Groundwater in Check, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 425 (2015) (discussing the practical consequences of 
the new groundwater legislation and outlining the arguments on both sides). 
128. See infra Part IV. 
129. See infra Part IV.A. 
130. See infra Part IV.B. 
131. See infra Parts IV.C.1–3. 
132. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. 
133. Id. 
134. See supra Part II.B.4 (explaining the evolution of the notion that the Board has a regulatory authority 
comparable to the legislature when dealing with unreasonable uses). 
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expanded Board jurisdiction, because Article X, Section 2 already grants the 
Board the power to limit unreasonable pumping.135 
An argument to the contrary might note that prior to SGMA, no court had 
addressed the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction. The Light case explored this 
issue in more detail than any prior authority, and Light itself did not address 
percolating groundwater. Arguably, because no court has ever clearly held that 
the pre-SGMA Board had the authority to directly limit percolating groundwater 
pumping under Article X, Section 2, percolating groundwater rights holders 
would not have reasonably anticipated that Board authority was a limitation on 
their property rights. In other words, Board regulation would not have 
historically been part of the bundle of sticks that made up their groundwater 
rights. 
The legislature’s adoption of requirements for sustainable groundwater 
management and allocation has granted new powers to the Board to regulate 
percolating groundwater pumping that did not exist before.136 Legislators working 
on the bills made a concerted effort to make the state stronger in its role as water 
manager.137 Under SGMA, the Board may now limit pumping even though the 
authority to do so largely did not exist before the enactment of the new laws.138 
Take, for example, the hypothetical case of an overlying landowner who 
extracts percolating groundwater from a basin underneath the property and uses it 
for farming. Assume further that this landowner is subject to the new 
sustainability requirements, but a groundwater sustainability plan has not been 
adopted for the basin. Under the law as it existed before SGMA, the Board would 
not be authorized to interfere with this landowner’s use of percolating 
groundwater.139 However, under the new legislation, the Board would be able to 
step in and deem the basin as probationary because no plan was created.140 The 
Board would then be able to adopt its own plans and limit that landowner’s 
pumping.141 
Therefore, at least in this one scenario, it is likely that the legislature has 
indeed expanded the Board’s jurisdiction This remains true even if one accepts 
 
135. CAL. WATER CODE § 1201. 
136. See supra Part III (detailing the shift in authority). 
137. See SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (stating in the legislative findings section that 
“[g]roundwater management will not be effective unless local actions to sustainably manage groundwater . . . 
are taken,” and that in order to do so, “robust conjunctive management” and state “authority to develop and 
implement an interim plan” will be necessary). 
138. Compare WATER § 1200 (stating that “whenever the [term] . . . water occurs in relation to 
applications to appropriate water or permits or licenses issued pursuant to such applications, such [term] refers 
only to surface water, and to subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels.”), with 
WATER §§ 10735.2–10735.8 (allowing for adoption of interim plans for “probationary” basins without any 
reference to whether percolating groundwater is exempt from coverage). 
139. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (impliedly exempting percolating groundwater from coverage under 
the Water Code). 
140. Id. § 10735.2(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 347). 
141. Id. § 10735.4(c) (enacted by Chapter 347). 
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the argument that such action on the part of the landowner is unreasonable,142 
because as far as the State Board is concerned, landowners in California have 
historically been left alone to do what they wish with the percolating 
groundwater sitting underneath their properties.143 
B. Water Rights are Property Rights in California 
According to the California Supreme Court, “courts typically classify water 
rights in an underground basin as overlying, appropriative, or prescriptive.”144 
Overlying rights are landowner rights to use groundwater on their own 
properties.145 Appropriative rights depend on a surplus of water and these rights 
holders may only take that groundwater that is “not needed for the reasonable 
beneficial use of those having prior rights.”146 Prescriptive rights arise where 
wrongful appropriative pumping of non-surplus groundwater takes place openly 
and notoriously for a continuous period of time, much like adverse possession of 
real property.147 
All of these groundwater rights are property rights.148 Like all water rights in 
California, groundwater rights are usufructuary, which means that owners have a 
“legal right to use the water,” but hold “no right of private ownership” in the 
corpus of the water itself.149 However, the fact that a property right is a 
 
142. See Imperial Irrigation, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1163 (stating that “the Board has adjudicatory power in 
the matter of unreasonable use of water.”); see also Allen v. Cal. Water & Tel. Co., 29 Cal. 2d 466, 484 (noting 
that “[t]he amount of water required to irrigate . . . lands should . . . be determined by reference to the system 
used”); see also Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 226 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1488 (2014) (holding that 
“[w]hat constitutes an unreasonable use of water changes with circumstances, including the passage of time.”) 
These authorities, when put together, permit an argument that the overlying landowner in the above 
hypothetical is using an unreasonable amount of water under the circumstances. 
143. CAL. WATER CODE § 1200; Cross v. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217, 222 (1886); Light, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1463. 
144. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1240 (2000). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 1241. 
147. Id. 
148. See Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 392 (1886) (stating that overlying water rights are property rights); 
San Bernardino Valley Mun. Water Dist. v. Meeks & Daley Water Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 216, 221 (1964) 
(noting that appropriative and prescriptive rights are property interests that begin to exist when certain 
conditions are met); Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (stating that “the right of property in water is 
usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use”) (emphasis deleted); N. 
Kern Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Delta Water Dist., 147 Cal. App. 4th 555, 559 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing to 
Smith v. Hawkins, 110 Cal. 122, 126 (1895)) (recognizing that “water rights are a form of property and, as 
such, are subject to establishment and loss”); Fullerton v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 
598 (Ct. App. 1979) (standing for the proposition that, “[a]lthough there is no private property right in the 
corpus of the water while flowing in the stream, the right to its use is classified as real property”); Locke v. 
Yorba Irrigation Co., 35 Cal. 2d 205, 211 (1950) (stating that “[w]ater rights are a species of real property”); 
Adamson v. Black Rock Power & Irrigation Co., 12 F. 2d 437, 438 (9th Cir. 1926) (noting that the proposition 
“[t]hat a water right is real property is well settled”). 
149. See 62 CAL. JUR. 3D. Water § 373 (2015) (noting that “water rights holders have the right to take and 
use water, but they do not own the water and cannot waste it”). 
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usufructuary right does not mean that it is outside the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment’s “takings” clause.150 
C. Applying the Doctrine of Regulatory Takings to Groundwater 
This section details the law of regulatory takings and applies those principles 
to the groundwater context.151 The United States Supreme Court has never ruled 
on a takings case concerning California groundwater, but its takings cases have 
established legal principles that guide application to groundwater.152 This section 
examines cases that have addressed takings claims concerning California water 
rights.153 Finally, this Comment concludes that SGMA itself does not result in a 
taking of property, nor will many (or even most) forms of regulation under 
SGMA, because a mere shift in regulatory jurisdiction from court-only to the 
Board cannot itself result in a taking.154 Instead, a takings claim will only be 
cognizable when a water right holder suffers a specific harm, such as limited 
pumping, and that claim must specify a harm other than the Board’s new 
assertion of jurisdiction, and the mere fact of some pumping limits would 
probably not support a claim.155 There may be specific circumstances in which a 
pumping limit disproportionately forces a property owner to bear a burden that 
should be shared by the public, and in those circumstances, a takings claim could 
be successful.156 
1. The Takings Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court 
The United States Supreme Court has a longstanding takings doctrine under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, in which the Court divides takings into 
categories of “physical” and “regulatory” takings.157 Within these categories, the 
Court has developed a standard for two kinds of “categorical” or “per se” 
takings: one that applies “to physical invasions and direct appropriations of 
property and complete wipeouts in value, even if those wipeouts were caused 
solely by regulatory constraints,”158 and another that applies when governmental 
action deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial or productive use.”159 If 
 
150. See Schimmel v. Martin, 190 Cal. 429, 432 (characterizing the usufructuary right to use water as “a 
right in real property,” as opposed to personal property). 
151. See infra Parts IV.C.1–3. 
152. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
153. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
154. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
155. See infra Part IV.C.4. 
156. See id (explaining the scenarios where a takings claim could be successful). 
157.  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
158. Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 271–72 (2013). 
159. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
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a regulation comes within either narrow category, a court should automatically 
hold it to be a taking and award just compensation to the plaintiff.160 
In contrast, the analysis for whether a taking occurred as a result of less 
extensive, albeit still significant, regulatory action is more complicated. In the 
landmark case Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York,161 the 
Court outlined a case-by-case analysis that should apply to regulatory actions 
interfering with private property interests.162 The Court’s test has three factors, 
none of which is dispositive on its own.163 Courts must decide a takings question 
based on: (1) the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” (2) the 
“extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations” of the claimant, and (3) “the character of the governmental 
action.”164 
Competing purposes help characterize the Court’s evolving doctrine.165 On 
one hand, recognition of takings claims “bar[s] Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.”166 On the other hand, the government must retain 
some ability to regulate, because “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some 
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for 
every such change in the general law.”167 
In the context of groundwater law, these competing interests will heavily 
influence the discourse going forward because of the ongoing power struggle 
between regulators and users.168 The state undoubtedly has an interest in 
regulating groundwater pumping due to the negative impacts of unregulated 
use.
169
 At the same time, however, rights holders have an equally weighted 
interest in their historically-preserved rights,170 and the agricultural industry will 
work to maximize profits by providing irrigation for as many crops as legally 
possible.171 
 
160. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 124. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Owen, supra note 158, at 272. 
166. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
167. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
168. See infra Part I (describing the conflict between those who pump and those who protect). 
169. See SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (finding that “[e]xcessive groundwater pumping 
can cause overdraft, failed wells, deteriorated water quality, environmental damage, and irreversible land 
subsidence . . .”). 
170. See Cross v. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217, 222 (1886) (holding that “[w]ater percolating in the soil belongs to 
the owner of the freehold.”). 
171. See CAL. DEP’T OF FOOD & AGRIC., CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS REVIEW, 2013–2014, 
at 5 (2014) (noting that California leads the nation in the production of over 70 crops, despite the current 
conditions of extreme drought and groundwater overdraft). 
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2. Water Rights Takings Cases from California 
This section reviews California and federal takings law in the context of 
groundwater.172 Two U.S. Federal Claims Court cases applying California water 
law help illustrate how a California state court could recognize compensation for 
interference with certain rights.173 In the first case, Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage District v. United States, a group of plaintiffs claimed their right to use 
water had been taken from them when the federal government imposed water use 
restrictions under the Endangered Species Act.174 The plaintiffs reasoned that the 
government had placed the costs of protecting local endangered species solely on 
their shoulders.175 The Court of Federal Claims found in favor of the plaintiffs, 
recognizing that “a mere restriction on use—the hallmark of a regulatory 
action—completely eviscerates the right itself since plaintiffs’ sole entitlement is 
to the use of the water.”176 
In the second case, Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, a 
different regulatory agency attempted to curtail rights holders’ water use under 
the Endangered Species Act.177 The rights holders brought suit alleging that their 
water rights had been taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment.178 The 
government conceded that, under California water law, the plaintiff had a “valid 
property right in the water in question.”179 The court went on to state that an 
application of the doctrine of physical takings was appropriate and remanded to 
the lower court to determine whether a taking had actually occurred.180 Thus, 
under California’s current water rights’ framework, courts would act well within 
the limits of the law by granting compensable takings awards in certain 
circumstances. 
Contrary to this rationale, at least one California court has held that 
governmental regulation of groundwater in the permitting context does not come 
within either category of per se takings, nor does it constitute a taking under 
Penn Central.181 In Allegretti & Company v. County of Imperial, a landowner 
alleged that the Board’s requirement to obtain a permit for certain groundwater 
 
172. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
173. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001); Casitas Mun. Water 
Dist. v. U.S., 543 F. 3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
174. Tulare Lake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 314. 
175. Id. at 316. 
176. Id. at 319; see also Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 407 (1931) (stating that “the 
petitioner’s right was the use of water; and when all the water that it used was withdrawn from the petitioner’s 
mill and turned elsewhere by [the] government . . . it is hard to see what more the [g]overnment could do to take 
that use”). 
177. Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1282.   
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 1295. 
180. Id. at 1296–97. 
181. Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1261, 1267 (2006). 
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drilling activities and comply with reporting standards amounted to a taking.182 
Despite recognizing that California’s Constitution allows a taking when “land is 
taken . . . for public use” and that “[t]he paradigmatic taking requiring just 
compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of 
private property,”183 the court held that “imposition of a . . . condition limiting the 
total quantity of groundwater available for . . . use” could not be a physical 
taking.184 The court also held that state intervention with groundwater resources 
does not constitute a total “deprivation of economically beneficial or productive 
use” because owners may still use the overlying land for farming and other 
financially gainful purposes.185 
Further, the Allegretti court did not see interference with groundwater rights 
as a taking under the ad hoc Penn Central test, because the economic impact was 
reasonable, and the landowner had no “distinct, as opposed to abstract, 
[investment-backed] expectations.”186 The court did not view the landowner’s 
interest in the anticipated profits when buying the farm as compensable because 
it believed that a landowner’s missed economic opportunity should not take away 
from the state’s power to regulate under both the police power and of the court’s 
understanding of Article X, Section 2.187 The Allegretti case is the only California 
case to examine whether regulation of an overlying landowner is a taking.188 
An older case suggests that the Allegretti court’s reasoning was not entirely 
novel.189 In Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, the California Supreme 
Court held that a compensable interest in water is rooted in reasonable use, and 
thus, regulation of unreasonable uses cannot constitute a taking.190 Although not 
dealing directly with groundwater, the Court concluded that no takings claim 
arises when the state regulates an unreasonable use, because property owners are 
not entitled to use their water unreasonably.191 Thus, although the Allegretti court 
did not need to cite to Joslin to reach its conclusion, the case law in California 
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3. Creation of New Jurisdiction Alone is Likely Insufficient to Support a 
Takings Claim 
Generally, when a state decides to allocate private resources for public 
purposes, such action necessitates a discussion of takings and just 
compensation.193 That principle begs the question of whether a shift in 
jurisdiction is equal to a state action for condemnation of private interests 
sufficient to create a facial takings claim. 
Case law answers this question in the negative. For example, in United States 
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the principle that 
“the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not 
constitute a regulatory taking.”194 The plaintiffs alleged that the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers had effectuated a taking by extending its regulatory 
authority to previously unregulated property.195 The Supreme Court confirmed 
that mere extension of regulatory authority does not, by itself, result in a 
compensable taking.196 
In California, the road is even rockier for a facial claim because courts 
generally reason that the ability to regulate groundwater use for public benefit 
comes “within the sphere of the [state’s] police power.”197 This notion could 
arguably take regulation of groundwater out of the takings conversation 
altogether.198 In People v. Murrison, the Third District Court of Appeal applied 
this police power rationale to restrictions imposed on an alleged pre-1914 right 
holder who was diverting stream water for irrigation purposes.199 In doing so, it 
noted that “[l]egislation with respect to water affects the public welfare and the 
right to legislate in regard to its use and conservation is referable to the police 
power of the state” and that “[w]ater rights have been the subject of pervasive 
regulation in California.”200 Ultimately, the Murrison court held that: 
where the government merely regulates the use of property, 
compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose of 
the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the 
economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly 
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singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by 
the public as a whole.201 
One final consideration for regulatory takings is the question of whether 
“background principles” of state law limit a takings claim for pumping limits 
under SGMA.202 In Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, the U.S. Supreme 
Court noted that the state does not owe compensation if the regulation simply 
reiterates the restrictions that the “background principles” of the state’s property 
law already place upon ownership.203 Because of this statement, the question 
becomes whether California’s background principles of groundwater law already 
dictate that unsustainable use is unreasonable. On the one hand, the California 
courts have long recognized the Board’s regulatory power to prescribe 
unreasonable uses,204 and unsustainable pumping could fit within the meaning of 
“unreasonable.” That would be a background principle likely to prevent 
compensation. Another, and perhaps more definitive question, is whether any 
entity had the authority to impose pumping cuts on percolating groundwater 
users prior to SGMA; if the users were subject to limits from another source prior 
to SGMA, then perhaps it doesn’t matter that the Board has not historically had 
the power to issue those limits. In this regard, the courts have always had the 
power to limit pumping to prevent overdraft and to ensure that pumping is within 
the “safe yield” of a basin.205 Because SGMA’s definition of sustainable use 
essentially mirrors the common law “safe yield” definition,206 the best conclusion 
seems to be that pumping limits to achieve a safe yield have always been part of 
a landowner’s so-called bundle of sticks. In other words, the potential for such 
limits has always been inherent in the water right. 
4. “As Applied” Takings 
Although reduction of pumping under SGMA is unlikely to support a viable 
takings claim in many instances, there may be a few specific scenarios in which 
regulation raises the specter of takings. First, there should be a cognizable takings 
claim if SGMA results in limits on individual riparian or overlying rights holders 
who pump from isolated aquifers that do not contribute to the problems of 
unsustainable groundwater pumping and overdraft. 
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Second, a takings claim might succeed where SGMA limits deprive a water 
user of all economically beneficial use of their water rights. The Lucas court held 
that, “when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all 
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave 
his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”207 Of course, this 
argument depends in part on what is required of the water user and how the right 
is defined—if the user is limited in critically dry years, but not every year, such 
regulation would likely withstand a takings claim. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Throughout California’s storied history as a leading agricultural producer, 
each branch of the government has worked to keep the state’s groundwater law 
current with evolving demands.208 Now, as the legislature pushes for 
sustainability and confers new authority on the Board, it is important to keep the 
longstanding framework in mind. The Board now has a scope of authority that is 
larger than before.209 Although such pumping limits are likely desirable from an 
environmental and policy perspective, this substantial legal change raises 
important questions about whether the government is overreaching in the scope 
of its impact on private property in the name of public benefit, at least without 
compensation. As described herein, this mere shift in jurisdiction is unlikely to 
support a viable takings claim; however, there may be some limited, specific 
circumstances in which state interference “goes too far” and results in a 
compensable taking.210 
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